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ABSTRACT
FACTOR AFFECTING DEGREE PROGRESS OF GRADUATE STUDENTS AT A LARGE
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Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is an important and basic element in
Smart Grid systems. Technologies grow complicated as the world becomes more convenient.
Power grid needs to be protected from potential cyberattacks, which may disrupt the power supply
and result in huge economic loss and affect people's daily life. It is important to use secure
communication technologies to enable various functions including bidirectional communications
and remote controls. Since AMI needs to be widely deployed to each home user, power companies
are required to build a large number of data concentrators to manage neighboring networks
uniformly to ensure that meter data readings can be accurately collected as well as ensure the
security of the data transmission process. Besides, since data concentrators are mostly deployed in
the public environment, the devices are vulnerable to the impact from outside physical attacks.
Therefore, this thesis proposes to construct an improved AMI communication network to increase
security and lower its cost. The thesis discusses the security standard, and how the architecture for
the AMI communication network is implemented using the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol based on the Software-Defined Network.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is the basic and important
facility in the Smart Grid. The AMI system not only monitors the electrical system usage
amount, it also combines the communication technology, and it provides bidirectional,
and it has remote control function. Compare to the conventional meter, AMI brings more
flexibility and advantages, e.g. it reduces manual collecting data cost, power shut down
recovery management. With environmental awareness is rising, every countries start AMI
project to provide electrical system management more efficiency.
Most of the power companies are not cooperating with Internet Service
Provider (ISP) very effectively, thus, we want more fast, secure, and effective way to
collect energy usage information. We usually set data Concentrator at the outside space
and basement, through the Power Line Communication (PLC) or Wi-Fi, and it collects
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) metering information regularly, then the data
concentrator sends the information to the central system through Wide Area Network
(WAN) by day. In order to let meter having standard rule when it exchanges the
information, the International Electro technical Commission (IEC) and other
organizations set the standards. IEC 62056 is one of the standard that widely uses when
the meter information exchanges.
The AMI architecture is based on the IEC 62056 standard, it includes
standards of meter module information, and definition of minimum authentication
security mechanisms, and the corresponding mode when it applies to different protocols.
1

Since the AMI combines with communication technologies, when the data is transmitting,
it includes huge amount of user privacy, and very important control signal of meter. If it
doesn’t have an appropriate security mechanism to protect AMI during the
communication process, the information security should be concerned. Data
concentrators are built in the public environment also it faces huge security challenges
nowadays.
We improve AMI expansibility, availability, data transmit security, and we
want to provide AMI a widely distributed characteristic. Therefore, we propose the
method to use Software-Defined Network (SDN) technology as a new tool, and we develop
a new AMI network system. Thesis uses Ethernet to transmit meter information, and we
separate computer network with AMI network, and system maintains Quality of Service
(QoS) to keep that AMI data throughput has enough bandwidth. If AMI works abnormal,
the system can take the initiative to cut the throughput, and it keeps data concentrator
availability. With the achievement of the above functions and analysis AMI standard rules,
we can provide an effective AMI management.
The contribution of this thesis is that we integrate SDN with AMI, it can
centralize and organize data flow easier and more convenient. If the attacks happen, the
SDN controller can detect the malicious packet flow in time, and it only blocks single AMI
instead of shutting down the whole system to protect power grid from the attacks in time.
We use Ethernet to exchange data, it can improve expansibility and reduce costs. We also
use virtual network skills to separate AMI throughput with other networks to ensure the
security and availability.
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1.2 Background
The smart grid generation is rising up; therefore, the traditional meter and
manual operation process, this complicated procedures will be replaced by the AMI
system, automated system, and communication system in the future. Fig. 1.1 shows that
the smart grid collects and analysis electricity usage information by AMI, then it uses
communication technology to send the information to the control center. Electricity
resources in every area will be scheduled very flexibly by using the control center, and it
transmits price information directly to achieve real-time performance [1].

Fig 1.1: Bidirectional communication sketch
AMI compares with conventional meter, AMI combines with communication
technologies, it can collect, monitor, detect by different communication protocols, and
restart, remote control when system breakdowns. It can reduce the cost of manual
collecting of data and maintain the system, also the efficiency can be improved.
In order to avoid the communication protocol incompatible, and system
information cannot use between equipment, Utility AMI formulates the high-level
requirements [5] which makes AMI suppliers can follow when they design and produce
the AMI, and it includes 18 requirements, table 1.1 shows it.

3

Table 1.1: High level requirement [5]
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According to the AMI requirements, and we want to satisfy AMI security,
consistency, scalability. International Technical Committee formulates the IEC 62056
international standards for exchanging meter information. IEC 62056 [6] uses object
recognition, modulation, access service, and it uses different protocol to communicate
information, and it provides different suppliers and systems interoperability. It includes
three different parts, Fig. 1.2 shows structure of COSEM:
1. Companion Specification for Energy Metering (COSEM) [6]
COSEM is a common interface model which is established for objectoriented methods. It is for the communication metering equipment. It allows us accessing
the meter data through this interface, and it manages the energy meter. COSEM standard
uses the model which we familiar, e.g. energy meters, water meters, gasoline meters, and
it is defined as instrument interface. At the same time, the COSEM specification defines
the object control interface and the communication channel.
2. Device Language Message Specification (DLMS) [6]
It is an application layer based on the objected-model idea. It is in the
application layer, it includes the encoding rules, and message interaction processes, and
it corresponds error handling mechanisms between client and server. The specification
and the underlying communication protocols are independent in the communication
medium, and they are using to support applications, such as remote meter reading,
remote control, and value-added services. At the application layer, meter objects use
DLMS services to ensure interoperability and interchangeability.
3. Transportation Layer communication protocol

5

It includes: Part 47 [7] defines the transmission layer standards to provide
TCP/IP transmission rules; Part 46 [8] defines information transmission layer standards,
and it uses HDLC protocol; Part 42 [9] defines physical layer standards to provide GSM,
twisted pair transmission standard; Part 21 [10] defines infrared transmission to achieve
local information exchange.

Fig 1.2 Structure of COSEM transportation layer and TCP/UDP service
As Fig 1.3 shows, smart meter includes many AMI system currently, and it
highly relies on the communication infrastructure, it also makes the power system
framework more complicated. The communication network not only has AMI network
flow rate, it also includes Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Phasor Measurement Units
(PMU) and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), etc… [12]

6

Fig 1.3 Smart grid-application and communication network [12]
Therefore, we want to manage huge amount of equipment more efficient,
and we let AMI has flexible expansibility and availability, and we want to satisfy current
transmission and security rules. We have to figure out more intelligent and automatic
management methods to centralize and optimize the smart grid.

1.3 Thesis structure
In chapter 1 we introduce smart meter, and we describe the standard rules.
Chapter 2 describes current AMI status, it includes the body framework, weak point, and
risk analysis, relevant standard and testbed. Chapter 3 raises information security and
communication protocol. Chapter 4 describes the details of the requirements. Chapter 5
discusses the Software-defined network framework and how to combine it with AMI.
Chapter 6 introduces system architecture. Chapter 7 shows the experiments and results.
Chapter 8 concludes the paper and future works.
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Chapter 2 Advantage/Disadvantage and Risk in AMI
Advanced Metering Infrastructure is the key infrastructure in the smart grid,
it is a system which integrates traditional meter reading with modern communication
technology. In this chapter, we discuss more details: framework, risk analysis, and smart
grid advantages based on a software-defined network.

2.1 Advanced metering infrastructure framework
Advanced metering infrastructure has two different communication
networks, it is wide area network (WAN), and neighborhood area network (NAN). It has
three important infrastructures: smart meter, data concentrator, and central system, as
Fig 2.1 shows.

Fig 2.1 Advanced metering infrastructure framework [11]
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2.1.1

Communication Network

1. Wide area network
Wide area network [15] is a data communication network that covers long
distance, and forms by multiple local area network communication technical. The
connection range can cover the whole country or even the whole world.
2. Neighborhood area network (Local area network)
Neighborhood area network [15] uses as short distance information and it
transmits between data concentrator and advanced metering infrastructure. It uses
different types of cables as the transmitting medium, and it connects small-scale
computer equipment together to achieve the purpose of resource sharing.

2.1.2 Important infrastructures
1.

Smart meter
Smart meter [16] has three main functions, bidirectional communication,

measurement, control function. Because it supports bidirectional communication
between the meter and the supplier, the communication from the meter to the network
may be wireless, or a fixed wired link, such as a power line carrier.
2.

Data concentrator
The main function of data concentrator [16] is the medium between central

system and data concentrator. It provides the transmission of information and control
signals through various communication technologies. Another function is that it can take
and collect the meter information in the manage area, and it sends information to central
9

system. Therefore, data concentrator must have longer and bigger storage to save
information.
3.

Central system
Central system [16] collects all user information from data concentrator,

and it can calculate the last electricity data statistic, analysis, and it provides electricity
company information for power dispatching and deploying. In addition, client can search
their usage information, and bill details through the power company network platform.

2.2 Advanced metering infrastructure weak point and risk analysis
Because of using communication technology to provide advanced metering
infrastructure bidirectional function, AMI communication risks are being highly valued.
In 2011, Ping-Hai Hsu, etc. proposed two levels of security [17]. It is high level and low
level respectively. High level is the information transmitting between the central system
and data concentrator by wide area network, the security mechanism uses public key
infrastructure (PKI) as an end to end certificate; low level is the information transmitting
between data concentrator and AMI by neighbor area network, it uses symmetrical
encryption as information protection.
The data concentrator becomes an important medium for the control center
and various communication protocol AMI types. It has bidirectional function, also it
needs to collect and storage AMI information and control signals from everywhere.
Therefore, if a low level security only uses symmetrical encryption, the security is not
strong enough. Because of symmetrical encryption feature, data concentrator and the
client must discuss a key to encrypt the data, but this will cause two problems.
10

The first problem is the key confidential during date transmitting, another
is that data concentrator needs to build different key with different clients, this behavior
will let data concentrator to manage huge amount of keys. It causes key management too
complex or inefficient. On the other hand, a data concentrator usually builds in the public
area, under the public environment, it may have some external physical destroy, and it
will have different impacts on AMI stability and data privacy.

2.3 Advantages of smart grid based on SDN
Smart grid has widely distributed characteristic, and we want to maintain
power infrastructure having high availability. We need to use reliable and secure
communication techniques to keep data’s security when transmitting. Therefore, most of
the companies use a special line or closed communication network as the solution, but
this solution doesn’t achieve high efficient security also it costs too expensive to maintain
the system. Some researches in recent years start using a software-defined network
concept to the smart grid, we hope that we can use SDN advantages to improve quality of
data transmission and security also lower the cost on system maintenance.
Xinshu Dong et al. [18] want to maintain the high availability of the smart
grid, they aware that the cyber-attack is not only from the external network, it can also
inject a back door attack to the equipment which just produces from the company. This
kind of attack will make a heavy threat to the company. The conventional security
mechanism such as firewalls is not enough to secure system, so it needs a more flexible
detection mechanism. Therefore, they proposed the SDN concept into the smart grid, and
the control center can deploy OpenFlow switch by the controller in order to surveillance
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throughput and filter suspicious packet, also it prevents distributed denial of service
(DDoS), and it keeps smart grid communication network available.
Jianchao Zhang et al. [19] observe that smart buildings not only improves
life quality, also it can reach energy saving and reducing carbon emission by auto power
switch. However, it needs efficient power management to build a huge amount of sensors
and microcontrollers in the building, and SDN can help them on connection. It has
flexibility and scalability, also it can achieve the purpose to customize control and
management for the client.
Young-Jin Kim et al. [12] mention that the current smart grid needs to
build a huge amount of sensors and controllers. Due to every equipment has different size
packets and frequency, and network throughput is more complex and it is hard to manage,
and if every equipment has their exclusive channel to transmit data, it can avoid mutual
interference, and it can improve data’s security. Current virtual network technologies are
increasing with the smart grid which is more popular, it is more difficult and complex to
operate also it costs higher on maintenance. Therefore, they designed a SDN-based
architecture solution for virtual utility networks (SUVN), they use network slice technical
to separate every equipment throughput, and then they can manage different equipment
network status respectively to enhance security.
Po-Wen Chi et al. [20] propose an SDN-based AMI threaten detection
mechanism to make sure that AMI data flow in a wide area network will not be attacked
by malicious modification. They use a rule-based detection system combined with SDN,
and they use OpenFlow switch to detect abnormal throughput to provide efficient defense,
and it can protect AMI from information threaten.
12

Chapter 3 Information/Communication Security Issues
Since the power grid integrates with communication technology, system
becomes more complicated, and the information transmits in the network getting more
dangerous. This security issue might causes huge damage such as if the cities blackout, it
will put people in danger. Therefore we are going to discuss some attacks and
communication protocol process.

3.1 Common cyber attack
The attacks usually happen by some tempting motivation which makes
attackers want to get. Power system is an important infrastructure for the human being,
if the system is attacked, it might cause system breakdown, information leakage, stop
working…, more serious, it could put people’s life and property in danger. Therefore, how
to analyze and prevent an attack is a big issue for us. In this paper, we organize a common
attack type and we divide them into four security requirements according to the attack
characteristic. They are confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation.
3.1.1

Confidentiality
Confidentiality in advanced metering infrastructure is an important

security requirement. If the hacker gets energy consumption information and hacker
saves it from meter via wiretapping, he can analyze the consumer life routine or observe
if there are people live in the house. Therefore, the consumers doesn’t want any people or
suppliers to save their information and personal privacy without authorization, and we
want to avoid equipment in the home area network or other auto systems saves AMI’s
information without authorization as much as possible. Meter Data Management System
13

(MDMS) also needs to keep consumer information in secret, so only the system has
authorization can save information.
3.1.2

Integrity
The meaning of integrity is not only for people that without authorization

to modify data, it also protects control commands of system forged by hackers, it will let
AMI be malicious operated without authorization. In addition, AMI needs to keep the
entity integrated, and we need to prevent it from physical destroying. If the equipment
was destroyed, it will cause energy usage information inaccurate, attacker can earn
improper benefit and consumer will pay more money.
3.1.3

Availability
When advanced metering infrastructure doesn’t work properly, it might

derivative many problems such as the energy usage information can’t be recorded,
especially when a data concentrator doesn’t work, it might cause big range AMI
information collecting inefficiency e.g. hardware damage, software malfunction or
communication interference and disconnection. Therefore, we need to use system
detection to keep AMI availability and evaluate the method how we can reply to the center
as soon as possible.
3.1.4

Non-repudiation
Non- repudiation is the most key point in the AMI information exchanging.

Because of AMI measuring energy usage information is the basis for expenses, if the
consumer doesn’t admit that the information is correct, it will have a conflict on the side.
In addition, the power company needs to identify the consumer who is legal or not, and
the company wants to avoid that consumer impersonates to transmit meter information.
14

Therefore, they need to make sure each identities, they use asymmetric encryption
technology, and it achieves non-repudiation by the correspondence between public keys
and private keys.

3.2 TLS communication protocol process
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [21] is widely using in the internet, it is a
communication protocol to protect information security. Because of the advanced
metering infrastructure build in the public network, if the meter’s data transmit without
encryption or authentication source, the data information will be very easy to modify and
wiretap. In this paper, we use the TLS communication protocol as the protocol when
information transmitting to achieve confidentiality, integrity, correctness of the source.
Current standard rules e.g. IEC 62351 [22] and NISTIR 7628 [23] are put TLS protocol as
one of the security rules in data transmission protocol.
Transport layer protocol is the version that enhances Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) security and information integrity by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
They enhance the Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm and define more alert
information e.g. decryption-failed, access-denied, certificate expired. Table 1.2 shows the
difference between TLS and SSL. [47]
Table 3.1 Difference between SSL and TLS [47]
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When client and server connect, it will start TLS connection process to
exchange encryption and both certificates. If the protocol version aren’t same or
certificate verification fail, it will disconnect to avoid any illegal communication, as Fig
3.1.

Fig 3.1 TLS communication protocol process [21]
1. Step One
The client sends “Client Hello” message to server when they connect, it
includes protocol version, encryption algorithm, and random number from client.
2. Step Two
After server received “Client Hello”, it will reply “Server Hello” to client and
compare both protocol version are same or not, and if they are different, it will disconnect.
16

Server sends the certification to client. The certificate is based on X.509 [24] standard, it
is a digital certificate issued by Certification Authority (CA), it includes public key, identity
verification, and it needs to make sure integrity and authentication. Certificate has digital
stamp and expire day to protect it be modified. If server needs to confirm client is legal
and safety, server will sent “Certificate Request”, and send “Server Hello Done” to client
in the end, it means server connection process over.
3. Step Three
If the server wants to verify client, after client receives “Certificate Request”
from server, it will send certificate to server, and let server verifies if client is legal or not,
then client starts check server’s certificate, if it is legal, then client can get the key from
server’s certificate; otherwise, client sends an warning sign to server then disconnect. If
the connect process goes well, client will send “Change Cipher Spec” and “Finish” to server.
“Change Cipher Spec” is using to tell server that client is secure, and ready to
communicate. They also use the encryption algorithm when they negotiate successful by
each other, add encryption on “Finish” send to server and it verifies the connection is
working well.
4. Step Four
After server receives encryption data from client, it uses server’s private key
to decrypt and verify. Server will send “Change Cipher Spec” to client and tell client that
server is ready and communication is safe, and it uses encryption algorithm. Send “Finish”
with encryption and transmit to verify connection.

17

According to TLS communication, if client and server are both encrypt and
decrypt successful, message can be verified correct, it means TLS channel is working well
and connection is done. Both client and server can use this channel to encrypt, transmit,
and use this to keep information’s confidentiality, integrity and correct identity in the
future.
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Chapter 4 Requirement Documents for AMI
About the AMI standard, many international organizations have formulated
some standards already, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
the International Electrotechnical Commission formulated ANSI C12 and IEC 62056
standards. The standards include the meter application layer information format, and the
design of the physical layer communication protocol. Because security requirements are
different in every country, they promulgate AMI standards very positively to meet the
criterion. Such as Utility Communication Architecture International Users Group
(UCAIug) promulgated AMI System Security Requirements [25] and AMI Security Profile
[26] to give AMI supplier, and let them meet the standards; In Europe, British Energy
and Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) formulates Smart Metering
Equipment Technical Specifications [27] and Netbeheer Nederland formulates Privacy
and Security of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure [28], both of them are asked for the
security of meter. In addition, AMI can communicate with control center to make sure
AMI will not affect the operation directly by whole power system. North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) formulates Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
standard [29], it formulates huge power system communication security rules to maintain
huge power system and let control center can operate reliably.

4.1 North America Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) CIP
With the smart grid is increasing, its equipment starts to combine and rely
on communication technologies, but it also lets the power grid facing communication and
information field’s threaten. When the transmission network and control center are
19

threatened by attackers or people who operates it incorrectly, it might cause big range
power shutting down or other injuries, the loss will be uncountable. Therefore, NERC
formulates the protection rules to make sure that the transmission network and control
center can operate well.
NERC [29] is a reliable organization which was authenticated by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). They dedicate to formulate and execute some
reliable standards, monitor a huge electrical system in North America, educate and train
people they hired in this area. It uses some standards to protect the electrical system. E.g.
NERC CIP 002 (essential communication property identity), NERC CIP 003 (security
management control), NERC CIP 004 (related employee education), NERC CIP 005
(Electricity safe boundary), NERC CIP 006 (essential communication property physical
security), NERC CIP 007 (system management security)…

4.2 New AMI Security Advices
Because the public enterprise purchased process and equipment supplier
need to follow security rules when they build AMI [26], public enterprise communication
user organization has AMI-SEC team and formulate an AMI security test standard, they
proposed a standard of smart grid’s home area network port to meter data management
system security method. This team studied AMI used cases, AMI risk evaluation, and
security service analysis to modify and enhance the Department of Homeland Security’s
development advice of control system, proposed a new AMI security advice shown in table
4.1.
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Table 4.1 AMI development advice [26]

4.3 Texas Electrical Network Communication Security Report
Since the smart grid incorporates with many advanced infrastructures, and
it highly relies on communication basis infrastructure, it lead to our electrical system
more complex, and it increases cyber attack’s risk, e.g. affect by weather, power grid
hacker, or some technical problem. In Texas electrical network communication security
report mentioned [29], Public Utility Commission (PUC) should put cyber-security as a
target when they start building a smart grid and smart meter. Therefore, some public
companies and organizations can participate in network security activities and training,
and put more effort to learn cyber-attacks e.g. DoS, DDos…, they try to learn and know
how to defense cyber-attacks in the future.
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They should embed some basic security functions to the system when they
design or build the equipment to achieve their security. There are many organizations
devote to formulate smart grid security standards, their goal is to provide professional
technical skills and security, and they hope they can provide consumer and supplier
quality assurance. Since new threaten keep increasing, most of these network security
standards are using current standards to adjust or help, and make sure each system and
equipment in the smart grid has good protection.

4.4 Smart Meter Equipment Technical Standard
In England, advanced metering infrastructures include electrical meter, gas
meter…, in order to keep infrastructures can at least maintain the lowest security and let
it meets electricity supply licenses and gas supply licenses standards, England Ministry of
Energy and Climate Change published Smart Metering Equipment Technical
Specifications (SMETS) [27], when they settle AMI, it needs to meet the requirement to
make sure the lowest security on physical, function, connect port and verify system to
promote third party development of the AMI.
The connection method of smart meter standards, we want our software
and hardware integrity, security, and availability, and communication quality of the
equipment will not be affected when the fault happens. This standard shows that when
smart meter executes any commands, response, or warning, it needs to encrypt and verify
information’s integrity, source, and receiver correctness. Therefore, encryption algorithm
needs corresponding to some higher level algorithms in order to hold their security. When
smart meter receives any security update from firmware, it needs to wait for firmware’s
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command for starting the installation or update. This procedure is to avoid the attacker’s
malicious installation.
The connect port security needs to have the function which can detect
communicate port on smart meter to avoid any information saved without authentication
or send control command from home area network port leads to housing equipment
malicious operate. According to above mentioned, if any abnormal happen, smart meter
must record all situation and report to higher system.

4.5 AMI Privacy and Security
Netherlands Grid Operator is highly focusing on privacy and security risks,
because this risk in the power grid operator and the consumer will cause huge influence.
Therefore, Netbeheer Nederlands decides to formulate strategies together [28], and it
establishes national smart meter privacy and security team to manage privacy and
security. All of the power grid operators need to follow the rules, they use the rules as the
basic framework to design AMI, and they reduce damage which AMI might occur.
In this standard, it includes four types, general step, equipment detail
requirement, information communicate requirement, and control center requirement.
General step indicates that power grid operator needs to define and show their purpose
on data collection, employee responsibility, AMI internal components authorization and
personal identity. They set the security strategies at the same time; equipment detail
requirement rules that the AMI and data concentrator entity must be protected and be
able to detect entity level of damage. They need to use end-to-end encryption when they
communicate to ensure information integrity, confidentiality, and source correctness;
information communicate requirement shows that the power grid operator needs to use
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cyber security step e.g. firewall, anti-virus software or invasion detect system to maintain
smart meter’s communicated channel availability, security, and quality; control center
requirement formulated that control center only communicates with the equipment
which authorized to avoid from the attack.

24

Chapter 5 Software-Defined Network
SDN creates network creativity, with each TCP / IP layer likely providing
individual creativity. The SDN enables networks and software interfaces becoming more
versatile and open, making it easier for network management. Compared to conventional
networks, SDN will provide more accurate and precise traffic control. It gives network
administrators the power to unilaterally change routing tables on routers, without having
to deal individually with each router. It also offers the ability to create new services
through virtualization. Finally, through the availability of the control plane, it provides
better and more robust security. For example, each user may have different capabilities
by the network to control their firewalls. [48]
SDN is used for several networking applications nowadays. For example, it
is used for simplicity of network management, and the control of virtual machines in
cloud computing and data centers. By removing proprietary architecture issues, it can link
multiple data center networks. In this method, the concept of offloading workload can
also be used for devices that require more powerful machines with other safety criteria.
Finally, SDN can be used for internet testing, without modifying the current network, to
test other ideas. [48]

25

Fig 5.1 SDN networks sketch

5.1 Introduction of SDN
In 2008, Standford University initiates the SDN research project, based on
software-defined network concept [30], they change traditional network control and data
transmission function to the controller and OpenFlow Switch. They build network
information more flexible, easier manage and control, and good enough to support the
requirement of network changing fast. Network manager can program functions what
network needs on the controller to manage information transmission and forwarding
path in the switch. The Controller is formed by OpenFlow Protocol, Network Applications,
and Network Operation System, it is in charge of switch’s packet transmitting and
forwarding; Switch is to implement OpenFlow protocol, Flow Table and Secure Channel.
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According to the definition above, When OpenFlow switch receives packet,
it will check the rule in flow table, and check if it corresponds to packet, then it forwards
packet if it meets the rule; if it doesn’t meet the rule, it will follow the protocol and send
packet with OpenFlow header information to the controller, and controller decides packet
next step, then it replies the result to the switch through secure channel. Flow table in
switch will add new rule and let switch dealing with packet at the same time.
With OpenFlow network architecture, we use controller to distinguish
meter’s network throughput, and we design a method to separate general throughput with
meter throughput. It can achieve security and monitor whole meter throughput status by
controller, and it can also detect abnormal traffic anytime.

5.2 SDN Controller
The key component of SDN-based system is the SDN controller. Controller
has the functionality portion, and it can be regarded as a network brain. SDN controller
collects information from network switches. By considering packet information,
determination and response. The SDN controller is allowed to drop the packet, and it can
establish a standard, and allocate standard to the switch. The SDN controller has two
interfaces, one for user applications and the other for SDN switches. First of all, called the
Northbound API. This API allows a designer to update the elements of the network from
distant points. Including the REST calls, which is essentially sending queries to a specific
web URL, it could be done in a few ways and it gets answers from them. We can use the
answer for those purposes. The second interface is the rule that is sent from the SDN
controller to SDN switches. The most popular Southbound API protocol is called
OpenFlow. [48]
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5.3 FlowVisor
FlowVisor [33] is a virtual network tool which builds on the OpenFlow
protocol, and the main function is to do logical slice network on physical network, and it
sets up many virtual networks on the network device, then separates each throughput as
Fig 5.2 shows. It can let multiple controllers controlling one switch. FlowVisor is a tool
between controller and switch, therefore, FlowVisor is according to the deployment rule,
it lets switch forwarding throughout to the corresponding controller, as Fig 5.3 shows. In
addition, controller can only control corresponding throughput, but it will not know the
network which controls slices network from FlowVisor. We use FlowVisor to slice network
can implement separating network throughput, and it lets AMI information throughput
not affected by other information throughput. It is not only protecting AMI information
bandwidth size also protecting information’s privacy and correctness.

Fig 5.2 Slice network sketch
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Fig 5.3 Multiple controller manage one switch together

5.4 OpenFlow
SDN allows the control plane to communicate with the data plane by using
those protocols. One such protocol is the OpenFlow. OpenFlow is the first standard
interface for communication specifying between the SDN architecture’s control, and
forward layers. It enables direct accessing and manipulating of the forward path, both
physical and virtual of network devices such as switches and routers. In other words, it is
a communication protocol that proposed to offer routing decision center (control plane)
communicates between routers and network switches (data plane). Simply, it gives
programmer leverage over router routing protocol. [48]
5.4.1 OpenFlow Switch
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OpenFlow [2] switch main function is to manage flow in the OpenFlow
framework, it includes three parts:
(1) Flow Table: It uses controller, and it saves the action which sends from switch in the
flow table, and switch can use this action to decide where flow to go.
(2) Secure Channel: A secure channel between controller and switch communicate.
(3) OpenFlow Protocol: Define how controller and switch communicate and transmit
information.
5.4.2 Flow Table
(1) Header file: Flow’s header information, OpenFlow packets has the OpenFlow header
different with other packets, it define all packet information e.g. source, destination.
(2) Action: Deal with flow action, e.g. command packet in or out from which port.
(3) Counter: Statistic packet information, e.g. packet send how many time, action table.

Fig 5.4 OpenFlow inner and connected with controller [2]
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Chapter 6 System Architecture
6.1 Comparison of AMI Communication Architecture
The AMI needs to build in every houses, and it always builds different
environment, this will affect AMI location evaluating result, and we want to avoid that
quality of information in data concentrator be affected. Also, data concentrator needs to
build in public, it might suffer some physical attack from outside or cyber-attack inside,
and it affects whole area. In this paper, network service suppliers play a role that has SDN
already, and it uses SDN to provide network service for clients. We also integrate SDN
advantages, and we propose a new AMI network communication architecture, we let AMI
transmitting information through Ethernet, and we compare advantage and disadvantage
with traditional AMI.
6.1.1 Conventional AMI Communication Architecture
The conventional AMI communication architecture is shown as Fig 6.1. The
data concentrator collects meter information in neighbor network every 15 minutes, and
it consolidates information then transmits to the meter reading information management
system in control center. We want to keep information integrity and availability, data
concentrator uses middle and short distance transmission technical, e.g. Zigbee, PLC, it
receives information in neighbor network, and wide area network usually uses long
distance transmit technical, e.g. GPRS, LTE.
In information confidentiality, because of neighbor area network and wide
area network are using different communication technologies; therefore, some
researchers use two levels security method [17]. Neighbor network uses IEC 62056-53
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security mechanism, and it allocates AMI and data concentrator encryption key from key
distributed center; Wide area network uses public key infrastructure to manage data
concentrator and meter reading data management system key by a special certificate
center. This key can encrypt and decrypt information and verify it, so we can keep
information integrity, legality, and we can check the source correctness to achieve two
levels of security mechanism.

Fig 6.1 Current AMI communication architecture [34]
6.1.2 SDN Based AMI Communication Architecture
In this paper, we propose a new SDN based AMI communication
architecture, as Fig 6.2 shows, we integrate SDN with AMI, and we let AMI transmitting
meter information to data concentrator every 15 minutes by general household network.
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We want to keep information’s confidentiality and integrity, the AMI uses TLS connection
with data concentrator, also we keep information security and source authenticity. On the
other side, we want to ensure that other network throughput not affects information
transmission bandwidth, we use virtual slice network, and then AMI can have
independent bandwidth.

Fig 6.2 SDN based AMI communication architecture simulation
6.1.3 Comparison between Traditional and SDN Based AMI Architecture
We do a comparison of the current communication architecture with
software-defined network communication architecture. With this comparison, we can
understand why the software-defined network can do much better work than current
conventional architecture. Table 6.1 shows the comparison details.
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Table 6.1 Current V.S SDN based communication architecture

Current communication architecture needs to build lots of data
concentrator, and it get meter information by different communication technologies, but
it costs a lot of maintenance cost to build data concentrator, e.g. it needs at least two
special lines on every data concentrator, and data concentrator has allowable number of
specific connections, if connections exceed the allowable quantity it might cause data
concentrator works abnormal. Therefore, it costs a lot to build the infrastructure. The
more internet routing table, the more complicated it is. Current network architecture
causes many problems which is becoming more and more inadequate. The switch and
router must constantly extend and reassemble the packets to implement different
network protocols, resulting in low transmission efficiency and unable to efficiently use
the network bandwidth. In addition, there is a high risk of manually setting one by one.
Once the network administrator enters the wrong command, it is easy to cause the
network service paralyzed.
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Data concentrators usually build in public and open environments, the
equipment entity is very easily destroyed from outside, it threatens AMI stability and
information privacy. Therefore, we propose AMI integrate with SDN technology, and
information exchanges under household network to centralize and manage AMI
information destination. If some malicious attacks happen, the SDN controller can detect
malicious attack packet in time, or it can block single AMI, malicious throughput in time
to protect power grid equipment. The potential risk exists, e.g. if client plugs out meter
system network cable or shuts down network connection equipment, it might cause meter
system can’t transmit information.

6.2 System Architecture
We use software-defined network advantage, and we propose new AMI
network communication architecture. We use Floodlight [35] as SDN controller to
manage and monitor meter throughput, and we use OpenSSL [36] to implement
transport layer security (TLS) encryption channel as information transmission protocol
to achieve information confidentiality, integrity, and source verification, then we use
Raspberry Pi [37] embedded system as platform and simple Python to simulate meter
information transmission, and we build a test platform as Fig 6.3 shows. This test
platform follows standards to achieve user interface, throughput separated, bandwidth
usage, abnormal detection, and active blocking, and we ensure AMI throughout
confidentiality, availability, and security when data transmitting in Ethernet.
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Fig 6.3 New AMI communication architecture

6.2.1 Controller and Switch
The main function for controller is to manage whole network throughput
and packet direction, it masters network channel’s availability. We use computer with
Ubuntu operation system to run control, processor is Intel I5-3470, and 16GB memory
and two 1Gbps Ethernet network port. Floodlight use as the controller operation system.
Switch is Pica8 P-3290 as OpenFlow switch with 48 1Gbps Ethernet network port.
6.2.2 Data Concentrator
Data concentrator responses multiple AMI connection at the same time,
and it receives meter information. This system is based on Ubuntu operation system,
processor is Intel I5-3470, and 8GB memory, two 1Gbps Ethernet network port. When
system starts running, it will wait AMI connecting with system by TLS communication
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protocol, if connection is successful, it will receive meter information at regular time, and
reply information to show that receive success. Fig 6.4 shows the process.

Fig6.4 Data concentrator process
6.2.3 Advanced Metering Infrastructure Simulate
We use embedded system Raspberry Pi [40] as our advanced metering
infrastructure hardware, it has central processor Quad-core ARM Cortex-A7, 1GB
memory, and 100Mbps Ethernet network port. When system starts, it connects with
data concentrator by TLS communication protocol, after connection successful
transmits meter information to data concentrator at definite time. We want to reduce
information complexity, we use time mark to generate a measurement value, it
follows IEC 62056-61 standards, and it lets AMI measuring value and related
information maps to 6 different object identification number, then it transmits to
data concentrator by TLS encrypted channel.
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Fig 6.5 AMI operation process
6.2.4 OBIS identification number
DLMS and COSEM protocol use the object identification system [41] to
make every value in meter, e.g. measurement value, data has united and unique
identification number. In IEC62056-61 shows this standard details, companies can build
identification number for their own meter information. OBIS is formed by 6 numbers as
Fig 6.5. [46]
A

B

C

D

E

F

Fig 6.6 OBIS number
The code consists of 6 groups sub-identifiers marked by letters A to F. All
these do not need to be presented in the identifier. Groups A and B are often omitted.
They cover metering data as well as configuration of metering equipment and status for
all applications. E.g. we can usually observe that if a meter has active power, its OBIS
shows like 1.1.1.8.0.255. [41]
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6.2.5 TLS Communicate Process (handshake)
We use TLS communication protocol to transfer information, and we ensure
the information confidentiality, integrity and accuracy of the source. Before TLS connects,
this system will make the asymmetric encryption pair of key, certificate and CA
certificates, this pair of key have public key encryption transmitting information; receiver
uses private key to decrypt, and validate identity by certificate; as a trustworthy third
party, CA certificate is a certificate that verifies all identities correctly. Consequently, all
devices certificate requires signature from CA certificate to prove that identity is checked
by third parties.
When AMI and data concentrator connects, it starts TLS communication
process to verify others correctness, we use Wireshark to prove communication process
shows in Fig 6.7.

Fig 6.7 TLS connect success
During TLS communication process, it shows alarm details and it
disconnects if any particular version or verify goes wrong. This process can avoid
communication illegally. As shown in Figure 6.8, when the opponent certificate has
expired by data concentrator confirmation, it will disconnect to prevent unauthorized
accessibility.
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Fig6.8 TLS connect fail
It has an encryption type due to TLS communication procedure. It includes
certificate, encryption, certificate number of information, and key exchange encryption
algorithm and it also meets most regulations. It makes information while transmitting,
preserve confidentiality, integrity, and source accuracy, and also it meets the standard
requirement.
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Chapter 7 Experiment Results and Discussion
We follow NERC CIP, Netherlands AMI privacy and security strategy and
America AMI security standards to implement 4 system functions for designing
experiment and test, and we prove that our AMI communication architecture meets
standards, it includes:


Graphical user interface (GUI): GUI can observe AMI’s network topology and
connection status, then we can monitor AMI network situation any time.



Throughput separated: Ensure third party can’t observe or get AMI’s packet
information.



Quality of Service: Ensure AMI has enough bandwidth during information exchange.



Abnormal throughput detect and active block: If some abnormal behavior happen in
AMI, we can block single infrastructure to protect power grid without block all
infrastructures.

7.1 Graphical User Interface (GUI)
The information management system is according to NERC CIP criteria. It
is an essential resource in the control center. Therefore it must fulfill all the specifications
of NERC CIP. NERC CIP 005 establishes the definition of electrical protective boundary
where electrical safety boundary equipment communicates with exterior equipment, the
control center must define external equipment. We can observe all correlations in this
paper.
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7.1.1

Experiment purpose
We want our power providers knows the current AMI connection status and

location of the equipment clearly and accurately, thus, it can handle the network status of
all switches and it links equipment with controller management. By controller topology
interface, we can observe all AMI networking under controller with data concentrator
status and throughput.
7.1.2 Experiment result
As Fig 7.1 shows, we use graphical user interface by controller to observe
whole network topology. When we want to build new AMI, GUI can identify AMI’s
location.

Fig 7.1 Topology status
As Fig 7.2 shows, controller can search any packet router on OpenFlow
switch to get AMI throughput information.
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Fig7.2 Throughput status

7.2 Advanced Metering Infrastructure Throughput Separate
Due to the requirement of AMI privacy and security strategy conceived by
the Netherlands power grid operator organization [28]. It includes that AMI throughput
is transmitted via communication channel, quality, availability, and security of the
channel should be guaranteed. One of the criteria suggests that people are unable to
measure customer preferences from the size of the AMI packet and the frequency of
transmission. Therefore, we want to ensure availability and security, we use FlowVisor
network slice technique, and it separates AMI throughput from public network.
7.2.1 Experiment architecture and purpose
In this paper, we use Ethernet to transmit data, and the bandwidth of the
meter will share with the general computer. We want to make sure that the bandwidth of
the computer network not influences AMI communicating bandwidth, and we maintain
AMI having essential and adequate bandwidth. We use SDN technical virtual network to
do the general network slice, and we let computer network throughput and AMI
throughput be divided, then we let controller control network bandwidth be sliced. As
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shown in Figure 7.3, power grid operator can control AMI throughput to ensure the
throughput from another network which sends to the public company is not disrupted.

Fig 7.3 Throughput separated diagram
7.2.2 Experiment result
In Fig 7.4 shows, we use Raspberry Pi and computers to simulate meters
and terminal equipment.

Fig 7.4 Raspberry Pi
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Before FlowVisor sets, we can observe all equipment which plug into the
switch and information, as Fig 7.5 and 7.6 shows.

Fig 7.5 Before FlowVisor, GUI shows whole network topology has five equipment

Fig 7.6 After FlowVisor, GUI shows complete network equipment and information
When we construct FlowVisor, and we set the rule for FlowVisor as Fig 7.7,
the first and second commands mean that we're adding a slice and commands active, and
we let special IP address controller to manage the network. Third and fourth commands,
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we can observe the IP address of the packet source, and the IP address of the destination,
the address of the Media access control and the destination executing the slice of the
network to achieve throughput separated.

Fig 7.7 FlowVisor information
We use FlowVisor as a tool, we separate switch port throughput, and every
equipment plug into port 1 and port 11 are using as AMI, and others use as terminal
equipment, and we can observe it from different controller.
Fig 7.8 and 7.9 show this experiment uses power grid operator controller
visual, it can only observe AMI’s network topology and information, and it can’t observe
other equipment on switch.

Fig 7.8 Power grid operator controller’s GUI shows AMI topology
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Fig 7.9 Power grid operator controller’s GUI shows AMI information
The view of network service supplier, it can only observe other terminal
equipment network topology and information, as Fig 7.10 and 7.11.

Fig 7.10 Network service supplier controller’s GUI shows network topology

Fig 7.11 Network service supplier controller’s GUI shows network information
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We want to do network slice, FlowVisor can follow packet IP address, MAC,
or port. Because of this experiment is using Raspberry Pi to simulate the transmission of
data, and it compares with actual AMI, Raspberry Pi produces a lot of unnecessary packet.
It may trigger some discrepancies between real AMI. The aim of this experiment is to let
people know that FlowVisor can implement this feature, and it can achieve separating
AMI and other terminal equipment throughput, it only needs to do network slice on
switch port.

7.3 Quality of Service (QoS)
In this experiment, we ensure channel quality and availability, and let it not
affected by household network. It may causes that AMI can’t exchange information with
data concentrator.
7.3.1 Experiment architecture and purpose
When terminal equipment are separated, we want to ensure quality and
availability of AMI channels, and we want to prevent that other computer network
throughput not influence AMI and results in packet loss, delay occurs, we use controller
to command switch and start Quality of Service (QoS) mechanism. In order to ensure that
the information bandwidth can achieve an effective working situation, QoS should take
priority position on specific information.
Fig 7.12 shows experiment environment, and table 7.1 is the network details.
We use Iperf [42] as network bandwidth testing tool, and we use Iperf to simulate general
network and AMI.

48

Fig 7.12 Implementation of QoS environment

Table 7.1 Implementation of QoS network configuration

7.3.2 Experiment result
We build a priority Queue to deploy in this trial. Queue is a first in first out
buffer zone, it measures the throughput rate through this buffer zone, and it changes the
throughput rate due to Queue state, and it reaches a restricted bandwidth. We set two
Queues, Q0 and Q1. Q0 in our experiment is the AMI information throughput and high
priority with network bandwidth of 0~20Mbps; Q1 is a common information rate, and
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low priority with a bandwidth of 0~100network. When system launches, the low priority
Queue can very change bandwidth flexibly, and it lets that high priority Queue has
adequate bandwidth to use, and it can achieve QoS mechanism.
Because of server and transmitter only have 100Mbps network card, after
test, we find out that overload bandwidth can achieve 94.4Mbps transmission rate;
therefore, we set Iperf server 100Mbps rate to simulate as household bandwidth. The
transmitter uses as household network equipment and AMI uses Iperf to keep sending
TCP packet to the server during testing, then we observe that we achieve QoS or not. With
this QoS strategy, it can occupy 20% of household bandwidth and it has high priority, and
other household equipment which occupies 100% bandwidth has low priority. When AMI
stops working, household equipment can use whole bandwidth; QoS starts working when
AMI starts to transmit meter information, and we ensure AMI can have 20% of whole
household bandwidth, and it is not affected by another throughput. Fig 7.13 shows the
result. Blue line is general network; Red line is AMI network.

Fig 7.13 Before/After AMI transmit information bandwidth
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At first, household network equipment starts sending information to
extranet server by Iperf, as figure shows. Household network occupies almost 100 Mbps
bandwidth, and AMI starts transmitting information after 10 seconds by Iperf, QoS starts
working, and it adjusts household network bandwidth occupation percentage, and it is
distributed to AMI which has high priority, and it lets that AMI throughput can transmit
normally. After AMI transmission stops after 30 seconds, it returns 20% to household
network.

7.4 Abnormal Throughput Block
In this experiment, we need to follow Netherlands and America AMI
security rules, when we verify that source identity is abnormal, and it fails three times, we
need to disconnect communication equipment, and it reports to upper system. The main
purpose is to avoid that any people without authorization access the information.
7.4.1 Experiment architecture and purpose
If attacker wants to attack power grid, our data concentrator service can be
challenged, and it may works abnormally. Therefore, if it fails 3 times, we count the
outcome of the communication process, the data concentrator must report to the
controller and it sends the IP address and MAC address of the alleged malicious attacker.
Controller can block this address, and it tells switch to block the throughput from this
address, and it achieves detection and controller handles it in time.
7.4.2 Experiment result
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In Fig 7.14, IP address *.*.13.80 has three times connection failed, data
concentrator records the IP address and MAC of this abnormal status, and controller
keeps checking that if data concentrator has any abnormal connection, if it happens,
controller receives abnormal connecting IP and MAC address which records from data
concentrator, then it commands switch to block this abnormal throughput.

Fig 7.14 Abnormal connect information record
After controller receives abnormal connecting IP and MAC address, it will
check switch which connecting with this AMI, and it sends block-commands to switch,
and it drops all throughput from this abnormal source. Fig 7.15 shows the detail.

Fig 7.15 Controller’s move after receive abnormal information
Controller Floodlight provides us to observe packet router, the packet from
MAC address b8:27:eb:ea:c8:94 is dropped, and Apply Action shows space which means
drop. This AMI is not able to connect with other equipment. Shown in Fig7.16.
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Fig 7.16 AMI be block
We can observe from AMI (Raspberry Pi platform), when it fails three times,
controller blocks it in time, it is not able to connect with it again. Shown in Fig 7.17.

Fig 7.17 AMI disconnect information

7.4.3 DoS attack experiment
If malicious attacker uses DoS to attack system, it might cause system
overload beyond its capabilities. Most DoS attacks are based on the exploitation of
vulnerabilities in the used communication protocol, such as TCP/IP protocol or the
underlying data link layer technologies, and their related protocols. There are three
common DoS attacks: TCP SYN Flood Attack, Land Attack, Ping Flood Attack... [43]
TCP SYN flood attack takes advantage of the flaws in the TCP handshake in
three ways. The basic approach is: the attacker host sends a SYN message to the target
host, and it initiates a TCP link, but the attacker host does not respond to the last ack
message, making it difficult to complete the TCP handshake, and the target host needs to
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devote resources to maintain this unfinished link until such a connection is reached a
certain amount. The destination host can no longer address certain requests for
connections. Construction of a SYNflood message is fairly simple, as long as the SYN bit
is set to 1, and then it connects to a port of the target host available service.
The Land Attack uses two main methods: IP spoofing, and SYNflood. The
Land Attack theory is filling in the target host IP as the source and destination addresses
in the IP header, and then it encapsulates a SYN TCP packet to send out. The receiving
host must, therefore, responds to the source address and maintain an unfinished
connection, and the source address is alone, so this loop will inevitably cause the host to
0 run out of resources, and it is not able to answer requests.
The Smurf attack is a method of attacking which combines IP spoofing with
flooding attack. First, the message content is configured as a particular request to be
replied to (such as an ICMP request), and the message source address is transformed into
the target host to be targeted. The host receives the message must initiate a message
response (such as ICMP response), and it gives a response message to the fake source
address.
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Fig 7.18 Attack simulation diagram
We simulate SYNflood attack for experiment, the SYNflood tool command
line uses to generate a SYN flood attack at the computer which we use as attacker. The
fake TCP SYN packet sends to the target, and this attack can be triggered individually or
simultaneously by the same attack host.
Fig 7.19 shows that if we set an attack host to attack the system, huge
amount of the packets be forwarded to the server at time 300, and starts DoS attack.
When the attack continues, the server breaks down at time 500 and starts losing all
incoming packets. After controller detect attack from overload packet status from switch,
it will disconnect the attack host computer by IP, MAC address, and smart meter can keep
sending normal packet to the controller.
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Fig 7.19 Packet flow during DoS attack
The percentage of packets lost rising drastically, almost 24% or more of the
packets lost was capture by Wireshark. When the rate of DoS attack rises considerably,
smart meters may breakdown and disconnect from the network.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work
Currently, AMI security issue is the most important in whole world. If smart
grid is getting popular, no matter power companies, equipment suppliers, or consumers,
they all need more good standards and security methods to ensure their rights not under
a dangerous environment. No one wants their smart meter information or personal
privacy to be accessed by others. Also, they want to collect AMI information more
efficiently, and lower the cost to achieve flexible expandability which is also a serious
development target.
In this paper we implement that SDN integrates AMI communication
architecture, with SDN concept to solve security and expandability problems in current
communication architecture, and we follow international standards at the same time.
The methods we propose has many advantages:


Using Ethernet to exchange information, improve the expandability.



Integrate SDN, centralize mange AMI network status.



Using virtual network technology to separated general network throughput with AMI
throughput to ensure security and availability.



Using TLS communication protocol to ensure confidentiality, integrity and source
correctness when information transmit.
Although we have the above advantages to solve current AMI system

problems, it still has a big range to enhance the system. E.g. If attacker destroys AMI from
its entity, and because of SDN very rely on controller, if controller is attacked, it will stop
the whole network system. Therefore, it is very valuable to do research on it. In this thesis,
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we only simulate a small range of AMI systems. In the real world, power grid network is
much bigger than our experiment, how to implement this concept to the real situation is
the most important for us to figure out. I hope this thesis can give a big view to the people
who want to do the research on it in the future.
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